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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
EFFECT OF A VOID REMARRIAGE UPON
OBLIGATION TO PAY ALIMONY
Sutton v. Leib'
Petitioner, Verna Sutton, divorced respondent, Leib, in
Illinois in 1919 and a stated monthly alimony was awarded
for so long as the petitioner should remain unmarried or
for so long as the decree would remain in full force and
effect. In 1944, she married Walter Henzel, who had that
day obtained a Nevada divorce from his wife, Dorothy
Henzel, a resident of New York who had not been served
in Nevada and who made no appearance there. One month
later, Dorothy Henzel brought a separate maintenance pro-
ceeding in New York. Walter Henzel defended in this suit
and the proceeding resulted in a decree declaring Walter
Henzel's Nevada divorce null and void. In 1945, petitioner
filed suit in New York for an annulment and Walter Henzel
defended and the petitioner received an interlocutory decree
declaring her marriage to Walter Henzel null and void be-
cause he had another wife living at the time of said mar-
riage. Petitioner then sued the respondent for alimony due
from the date he ceased making regular payments, that is,
when the petitioner was married in Reno, Nevada, to a date
in 1947 when she validly remarried another person. The
lower court gave summary judgment for the defendant-
respondent on the basis of purported settlement and release.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and Held:
that the New York annulment of the Nevada divorce must
be accorded full faith and credit in Illinois and that the
effect of the Nevada marriage and the New York annul-
ment upon the obligation of the respondent in the alimony
suit must be determined under Illinois law. Upon rehear-
ing in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,2
it was Held: that the Illinois law is to the effect that
the alleged remarriage of the petitioner to Walter Henzel
was completely void, not merely voidable, and that the peti-
tioner was entitled to back alimony payments for the en-
tire period, but not for court costs and attorney's fees, the
latter holding being based on the fact that the respondent
acted in good faith in contacting the petitioner and her
attorneys and therefore it would be inequitable to saddle
him with these extra costs.
1342 U. S. 402 (1952).
2 Sutton v. Leib, 199 F. 2d 163 (1952).
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The scope of this casenote will include a review of
previous Supreme Court rulings upon the situation caused
by migratory divorces, the applicable Maryland law, plus
a few practical considerations of the entire matter.
Under the old English law, divorces could only be had
by an act of Parliament. This idea was transported to the
colonies and became part of our practice. This was the
situation in Maryland until 1841 at which time by legisla-
tion, the courts of Equity were empowered with concurrent
jurisdiction in divorce. Some ten years elapsed before the
Equity courts by constitutional fiat, were granted sole
jurisdiction.4
When divorces were granted by the legislatures of the
states and territories, an early Supreme Court case upheld
the validity of a divorce granted without any service or
notice whatsoever on the wife.5 But this situation has been
remedied by the requirements of domicile and service.
In migratory divorces, where one party travels to an-
other state to procure a divorce, one of the main points in
issue in most cases is whether there is a valid domicile. It
is not so much the fact that one wishes to take advantage
of another state's less rigid requirements for divorce, but
the cases hold that there must be an intent to make that
state the domicile for an indefinitely permanent period.
Mere residence, that is, living in the state for a short time
with intention to return to the previous state, is not suffi-
cient for divorce. Thus to assume jurisdiction, the courts
must find a valid domicile. Under the old English Common
Law, it was felt that the husband and wife had the same
domicile, regardless of where the wife was; but the view is
now to recognize the fact that the wife may have a separate
and distinct domicile
As to the procedural requirement of proper service, per-
sonal service upon the defendant is the most desirable, but
substituted service upon a non-resident is valid in some
cases. 7 This is usually done by registered mail with a re-
quest for a signed return receipt acknowledging delivery.
But it has been held that where a letter was sent by ordi-
nary mail and never returned, that the marking on the
envelope requesting that the letter be returned after five
days if not delivered, was sufficient to show delivery, since
8 Md. Laws 1841, Ch. 262, Sec. 1 et seq., Md. Code (1951), Art. 16, Sec. 31
et 8eq.
'Md. Constitution 1851, Art. III, Sec. 21; Cf. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW (1915), 181, 409.
5 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888).
6 Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582, 593 et seq. (U. S., 1858).TPennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 727 (1877).
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the letter was not returned.' But in order to enjoy the
benefit of substituted service, the petitioner must be validly
domiciled within the state of the forum. One petitioner
lost his case because at the time of the trial, it was dis-
covered that he had signed a probate petition in a neighbor-
ing state, wherein he affirmed that he was a resident of the
latter state.' Also one cannot state that he is domiciled in
one state, and file divorce proceedings there, and while the
action is pending, travel to other states to enjoy a vacation,
and then return to that state only long enough to obtain
the divorce. °
Many states have a strong public policy in regard to the
granting of divorces and will not permit a resident to leave
the state merely to obtain a divorce, even where the wife
appears in the other state and answers the petition, but
later withdraws her answer. The theory of such holdings
is that the parties to a marriage cannot dissolve the mar-
riage themselves and it would be unjust to allow them to
go to another state to circumvent the law." Also, the fact
that the defendant may flee the jurisdiction before the
verdict is given, will not serve to stay the proceedings, the
verdict being given in the absence of the defendant. 2
This brings us, in point of time, to the controversial case
of Haddock v. Haddock," which held that where the state
court, even of the plaintiff's domicile, did not have juris-
diction either of the subject matter or of the person of the
defendant, the decree so issued would not be entitled to full
faith and credit. Since this case has been extensively re-
viewed in an earlier article in the REVIEw 14 it will suffice,
for the purposes of this casenote, to say that the Haddock
case was explicitly overruled by the two Williams cases. 15
8 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 171 (1901).
Bell v. Bell, 181 U. S. 175 (1901).
10 Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179 (1901).
Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14 (1903).
German Savings Society v. Dormitzer, 192 U. S. 125, 128 (1904).
201 U. S. 562 (1906).
1 STRAHORPN and REIBLICH, The Haddock Case Overruled - The Future of
Interstate Divorce, 7 Md. L. Rev. 29 (1942). Cf. also STRAuoRN, A Rationale
of the Haddock Case, 32 Iil. L. Rev. 796 (1938) ; STRAHORN, The Supreme
Court Revisits Haddock, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 412 (1938).
'5Infra, ns. 21, 22. Also consider the latest Supreme Court ruling in the
Virgin Islands case, Granville-Smith v. Granville-Smith, ... U. S ... , 75
S. Ct. 553 (1955). In this case the court said that the Virgin Islands had
no right to enact a law giving it jurisdiction of divorce cases where there
was a residence requirement of six weeks. The court held that Congress
never intended the local legislature to enact a law of such scope and
authority, to aid outsiders. Justice Clark's dissent recognized the idea that
since the divorce could be easily obtained in one of the states, there was
no reason to require the parties to travel 2400 miles over land rather than
1500 miles over water to obtain the same result. Dis. op., 561, 568.
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The average layman, and sometimes the lawyer, often
loses sight of the state's interest in the matter of divorce,
feeling that the state need make only certain procedural
requirements with which one must comply. The dissent in
a Supreme Court case from South Carolina brought this
point home and stressed it quite strongly. 6 The majority
opinion felt that where a decree of divorce in Georgia
granted support to the child of the marriage, then South
Carolina could not subsequently alter or increase the decree
to provide more money for the child. The dissent felt the
state of South Carolina had a sufficient interest in the off-
spring, in order to prevent the child from becoming a ward
of the state, that the decree ought to be modified. They
wanted to invoke the police power of the state to protect
the child's interests and to allow the attachment of the
father's property in South Carolina. The purpose of The
Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution 7 has been
interpreted as follows:
".... to alter the status of the several states as inde-
pendent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obli-
gations created under the laws or by the judicial pro-
ceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts
of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a
just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespec-
tive of the state of its origin."' 8
However, in binding together the states so as to recog-
nize the decisions of sister states, the forum state is not
precluded from inquiring into the question of the jurisdic-
tion of the state where the case originally began and thus
to satisfy itself that the parties were properly before the
first court. This being so, then, and only then, are they com-
pelled to give full faith and credit to the decision. As the
Supreme Court has said:
"The power of the Idaho Court to examine into the
jurisdiction of the Washington Court is beyond ques-
tion. Even where the decision against the validity of
the original judgment is erroneous, it is a valid exercise
of judicial power by the second court.
"One trial of an issue is enough. 'The principles of
res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as
"Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 90 A. L. R. 924 (1933),
dis. op. 213.
U. S. Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 1, U. S. C. A. 508.
'Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 277 (1935).
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to other issues', as well to jurisdiction of the subject
matter as of the parties."'19
And in Milliken v. Meyer," the court said:
"Where a judgment rendered in one state is chal-
lenged in another, a want of jurisdiction over either
the person or the subject matter is of course open to
inquiry.... But if the judgment on its face appears to
be a 'record of a court of general jurisdiction, such
jurisdiction over the cause and the parties is to be pre-
sumed unless disproved by extrinsic evidence, or by
the record itself'."
Perhaps the two most controversial cases concerning
the matter of domicile in divorce are the two Williams'
cases, hereafter referred to as the first Williams case2 and
the second Williams case.22 In both cases the facts were
the same. Mr. Williams had lived with his wife for nearly
24 years in North Carolina; Mrs. Hendrix had lived with
her husband for about 20 years in North Carolina. In May
of 1940, they left their respective spouses and went to
Nevada, where they both obtained divorces. The two then
were married in Nevada and returned to North Carolina
to live. In the first case, they were convicted in North Caro-
lina of bigamous marriage, which conviction was reversed
upon appeal to the Supreme Court because the lower court
failed to decide the question of the validity of the domicile
in Nevada. This mistake was corrected in the second
Williams case, where the parties were convicted of biga-
mous cohabitation. The first Williams case explicitly over-
ruled the old Haddock case.23 The Court in that case stated
that it would not interfere with the policy of the several
states, some to grant divorces on more liberal grounds than
other states, and that in the absence of legislative action by
Congress, the laws of the states would be strictly construed.
Thus the Court upheld the validity of the divorce regard-
less of how offensive it might be to the public policy of
North Carolina. But in the second Williams case, the issue
of domicile was contested and found lacking so as to make
the Nevada divorce null and void. Justice Frankfurter in a
concurring opinion2 4 in the first case pointed out that in
Canada and Australia, divorce was regulated by national
"Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 78 (1939).
"311 U. S. 457, 462 (1940).
"Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
"Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1945).
Supra, n. 13.
Supra, n. 21, cone. op. 304.
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legislation and that many of the problems that confront
the American lawyer are remedied. In the second Williams
case, domicile was lacking because the parties could not
show that there was a good faith intent to remain domiciled
in Nevada.
The dissents in the second Williams case felt that the
idea of domicile in divorce was out of place as being too
vague, and subject to the whim of the husband. It was felt
improper that the test of domicile should revolve around
the idea that a man was going to achieve a domicile for
"either a permanent or for an indefinite or unlimited length
of time".25 It is felt that there should be a more definite test.
There are many cases involving the attempt to relitigate
a divorce and such attempts are almost always held void.
The usual practice is to appeal the case in the state where
the action occurs, and not to later wait and try to contest
the divorce again collaterally.26 And where one obtains a
divorce in another state after failing in an attempt to secure
a divorce in the first state, it is fatal if the spouse contests
the divorce action in the second state and loses. The losing
spouse cannot later press a contempt charge in the first
court.
27
2 Supra, n. 22, Justice Rutledge dissenting, 244, 256, 257-8:
"The conception (of domicile as a requirement for divorce) has out-
lived its jurisdictional usefulness unless caprice, confusion and contra-
diction are the desirable criteria and consequences of jurisdictional
conceptions.
"Stripped of its common law gloss, the basic constitutional issue in-
herent in the problem is whether the states shall have power to adopt
so-called 'liberal' divorce policies and grant divorces to persons coming
from other states while there transiently or for only short periods not
sufficient in themselves, absent other objective criteria, to establish
more casual relations with the community....
"He (the husband under domicile) need do no more than decide, by
a flash of thought, to stay 'either permanently or for an indefinite or
unlimited length of time'. No other connection of permanence is re-
quired. All of his belongings, his business, his family, his established
interests and intimate relations may remain where they have always
been. Yet if he is but physically present elsewhere, without even bag
or baggage, and undergoes the mental flash, in a moment he has created
a new domicile though hardly a new home." (Parenthetical material
added.)
Supra, n. 22, Justice Black dissenting, 261, 278:
"In earlier times, some rulers placed their criminal laws where the
common man could not see them, in order that he might be entrapped
into their violation. Others imposed standards of conduct Impossible
of achievement to the end thalt those obnoxious to the -. uling powers
might be convicted under the forms of law. No one of them ever pro-
vided a more certain entrapment than a statute which prescribes a
penitentiary punishment for nothing more than a layman's failure to
prophesy what a judge or jury will do. This court's decision of a federal
question today does just that."
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U. S. 343 (1948).
Coe v. Coe. 334 U. S. 378 (1948).
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Collateral attack, is usually forbidden. A child of a
divorced party has no right to attack the validity of the
divorce decree after one of the spouses is deceased." The
same is true when a husband finds that his wife never had
a valid divorce from her first husband. When he sends her
to another state to get a valid divorce, probably without
intent to acquire domicile, the husband himself cannot later
attack the validity of the divorce. 9
This brings us to the case at issue, Sutton v. Leib,30
which from the point of stare decisis, is good law as it
reiterates the concepts of domicile as developed in prior
cases. There was no personal service in the Sutton case
and the wife did not appear. It also appears that Walter
Henzel went to Nevada solely to obtain a divorce and thus
there was no valid domicile in order to give the Nevada
Court jurisdiction. Thus Walter Henzel's remarriage was
bigamous and void.
In the case at issue, respondent Leib is bound by the
various suits and their outcome, even though he never was
a part of them nor had a chance to appear. The doctrine
of res judicata applies to Leib in that the judgment ren-
dered in the annulment suit of petitioner Sutton and Walter
Henzel is admitted for the purpose of proving a merely col-
lateral or subordinate fact, revelant to the case at issue.
The rule is well recognized that a judgment in one suit is
admissible in another one, although against a different per-
son, where the judgment is produced to prove that a cer-
tain state of facts exist, where the existence of that state
of facts is admissible as to the issue on trial or relevant
thereto." Judgments in rem are considered binding on third
persons, as are judgments or decrees determining the status
or relations of individuals, as for instance, decrees of
divorce.3 2 Thus a decree of divorce might be used to show
that there was a valid marriage and also a valid divorce.
Or a decree of annulment could be introduced to show that
the parties had attempted a void or voidable marriage, as
in the case at issue. Such decrees are admitted in Mary-
land "'to prove res ipsam and the legal incidents and con-
sequences' thereof, but 'not to prove the facts' upon which
they are founded". The limitations upon their admittance
Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U. S. 581 (1951).
2 Cook v. Cook, 342 U. S. 126 (1951).
- 342 U. S. 402 (1952).
8Wilcox v. Bear, 140 Wash. 39, 248 P. 59 (1926), citing JONES oN EVIDENCE
(3rd ed., 1950), Sec. 590.
n Fitchette v. Sumter Hardwood Co., 145 S. C. 53, 142 S. E. 828, 833 (1928).
- Packham v. Glendmeyer, 103 Md. 416,423, 63 A. 1048 (1906).
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are very heavy, and quite often are left to the discretion of
the trial judge as to whether their admittance is material.
But the authorities are practically unanimous in their hold-
ings to the effect that the decrees are admissible and serve
as res judicata as against the rest of the world. Here against
the respondent Leib, the decree would be admissible only
to the extent of judicially establishing the prior existence
of the marriage and its dissolution and the status of the
parties thereafter under the decree. 4 Thus in the case at
issue, the subsequent annulment of the petitioner Sutton's
previous void marriage to Walter Henzel serves as res
judicata and is admissible to show that there was never a
valid remarriage by her. Thus respondent Leib is bound by
the decision and is forced to pay alimony on the strength
of the prior annulment decision even though he was not a
material party, but was definitely an interested party.
In remanding the case at issue to the lower Illinois
Federal Court, the Supreme Court suggested that the law
would be similar to a New York case which allowed the
spouse alimony except during that period of her attempted
remarriage, since she was being supported by her second
spouse and it would be unfair for her to receive support
from two men.85 But the Illinois court, in determining
Illinois law, applied another New York case which held
that the second marriage was void, not merely voidable,
and that there is no duty to support under a void marriage. 6
Thus petitioner Sutton was entitled to alimony, even
though she was actually being supported by another man,
Walter Henzel. But the Illinois law is to the apparent effect
that where there is a remarriage that is prohibited within
a one year period, but there is a marriage in that period,
and the marriage later annulled, there was no obligation
to pay alimony." This case makes the Illinois decision
seem improper.
If the case were to arise in Maryland, the probable result
would be as follows. Maryland would not recognize the
Nevada divorce obtained by Walter Henzel because of lack
of jurisdiction in the Nevada Court." The attempted re-
marriage would be void and the Court of Appeals has
hinted that an annulment decree would not be absolutely
Luick v. Arends, 21 N. D. 614, 132 N. W. 353, 355 (1911), cited 20 A. L. R.
2d 1163, 1174.
Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E. 501, 503 (1929).
Landsman v. Landsman, 302 N. Y. 45, 96 N. E. 2d 81, 82 (1950).
'Lehman v. Lehman, 225 Ill. App. 513 (Ill., 1922), cited, 155 A. L. R.
609, 620.
8 Walker v. Walker, 125 Md. 649, 94 A. 346 (1915).
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necessary, only desirable. 9 Alimony ceases automatically
when a wife remarries in Maryland," and Maryland has
stated that it would be unfair and against the intent of the
law that a woman should be entitled to support from two
men.4' While the above cases speak of alimony under a
valid remarriage, this writer feels that it would apply to
a void remarriage also. The doctrine of support from two
men would be equally applicable in both cases during the
intervening period of the attempted remarriage, particu-
larly since the action would be in the equity courts, and
the court might easily find that it would be inequitable to
grant the wife support by two persons at the same time.
Maryland has always given great weight to English de-
cisions and in Holt v. Holt,"' an English judge held that the
husband ought not to be called upon to pay alimony for
that time during which the wife had other means of sup-
port, and said that it was immaterial as far as this question
was concerned, whether she was living in adultery. The
ground upon which the court proceeded was that she was
living in such a manner that she had means of support in-
dependent of her husband. While this case was changed
by law in 1857, no such law has been passed in Maryland.
Thus from a consideration of the facts and cases, the Mary-
land law ought to be different.
The entire problem of domicile as a requirement of
divorce has served to complicate the problem immensely.
It seems to revolve around a discussion as to whether some
states should be allowed to grant divorces with relative
ease, while some states are most strict. The matter of
"state's rights" might well be given precedence to the prob-
lems of the attorney in attempting to counsel his client.
Many states have enacted statutes prohibiting one from
going into another state to obtain a divorce.43
Several noteworthy persons, among them Senator
McCarran of Nevada, as well as some prominent legal au-
thorities, have been pressing for Federal legislation in the
field of divorce. This procedure is common in Canada and
Australia4 and has rid those countries of the problems
which we encounter continuously.
Townsend v. Morgan, 192 Md. 168, 173, 63 A. 2d 713 (1949).
40 Spear v. Spear, 158 Md. 672, 674-5, 149 A. 468 (1930).
41 Emerson v. Emerson, 120 Md. 584, 595, 87 A. 1033 (1913), cited 30
A. L. R. 79, 82.
42 (L. R.), 1 Prob. & Div. 610 (1868).
SAnn. Laws Mass. (1955), Ch. 208, Sec. 39; CI. also Uniform Divorce
Recognition Act, 19 U. L. A. (1951), 367, in effect in several states, but not
in Maryland.
11 Supra, n. 24.
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It would not be difficult for the government to find an
interest to enable it to intervene. The states themselves
have many times expressed their own interest in the matter
of divorce, particularly in the event that the offspring
should become wards of the community.45 Considering the
number of broken homes that result from divorce, the tre-
mendous rate of increase in juvenile delinquency, and the
increased crime rate, the Federal government would have
a strong argument for the protection of the family life by
making divorces more difficult to obtain. Thus if sufficient
obstacles were placed in the way to hinder divorce, and
thus encourage many couples to remain together and to try
to solve their own problems, rather than run to another
state to obtain an easy and painless divorce, certainly a
great deal could be accomplished. And by thus federalizing
the law, a large portion of divorce litigation would be
eliminated.
'
5 Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202 (1933), di8. op. 213, 220 et 8eq.
See special Announcement of Army positions available to lawyers on
second page following.
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